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Bankruptcy, Contracts and Utilitarianism
Anita F. Hill
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent efforts to develop a jurisprudence of bankruptcy have applied
contract theories to the Bankruptcy Code.' This Article examines two models
of contract theory as they illuminate the laws of insolvency under Chapter 7
of the Code. It concludes that the utilitarian rather than contractarian
paradigm of contract law is the appropriate model for analyzing bankruptcy
law, despite the fact that the latter provides the basis for contract law as it is
primarily studied today.
The Article begins by analyzing the relationship of contract law to
bankruptcy law. It evaluates two models of contract theory: utilitarianism and
contractarianism. It then turns to the policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code
and argues that those policies are utilitarian in principle. Specific provisions
of the Code demonstrate how the structure of the Code promotes utilitarian
principles. Finally, the Article discusses the tensions created by formulating
bankruptcy law according to the contractarian model and how these tensions
are eased by relying on a utilitarian model as the basis for bankruptcy law.
When two parties enter into a contract, the possibility exists that one
party to the contract will regret the bargain before performance is completed.2
Most likely this regretting party will be the individual who has yet to
perform. This individual typically will choose one of three alternatives. She
will perform despite the regret and risk loss of her expected benefit.' She will
* Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma; J.D., Yale University, 1980. The
author wishes to thank Patricia Brumfield Fry, Professor of Law, University of North
Dakota, for her thoughtful comments and assistance on early drafts of this article.
1. Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REv. 953 (1981); See
Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775 (1987); Weistart, The Costs of
Bankruptcy, 41 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 107 (Autumn 1977).
2. Modem theorists describe this as the free-rider problem. The possibility of
regret exists even in situations where the promise to perform was made in good faith.
Goetz and Scott describe the contingency as a "future occurrence ... that would
motivate breach if breach were a costless option for the promisor." See Goetz & Scott,
Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261,
1273 (1980).
3. "Under the American law of contracts, after the other party has fully performed
his obligations it is absolutely irrational for you to fully perform yours." Leff, Injury,
Ignorance and Spite; the Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1970).
4. Where the costs associated with breach, including the penalty imposed by law,
1
Hill: Hill: Bankruptcy, Contracts, and Utilitarianism
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
breach the contract and risk the sanctions for such a breach,5 or she will
attempt to modify the terms of the contract to allow a benefit consistent with
her expectations. Each alternative offers advantages and disadvantages.
Depending on the circumstances and reasons for regret, one or more
alternatives may not be feasible. Performance might be too expensive,7 or
literally, or legally impossible.8 Breach, though less costly economically, may
iesult in loss of goodwill or injury to the individual's reputation. Finally, the
cooperation of the other party necessary for renegotiation of the contract may
be unattainableY To enter into, perform, and even breach a contract are
rights recognized as part of the freedom of contract.10 The individual in
exceed the cost of compliance the contracting party predictably will perform assuming
there exists a legal mechanism for enforcing the contract. See Barton, The Economic
Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 278 (1972). See
also Leff, supra note 3, at 7-18 for a discussion of the collection cost to the
nonbreaching and breaching parties of enforcing the contract.
5. A calculation of the sanctions for breach must include a consideration of the
likelihood that the sanctions will occur. See Leff, supra note 3, at 18-19. Presumably
if the party had knowledge of all the future alternatives and could competently evaluate
the costs of each alternative she would choose the cheaper between breach or
performance. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 2, at 1273.
6. Parties may use a variety of risk allocation devices in their initial bargain
which can account for uncertainties or parties may agree to modify to meet circum-
stances as they occur. If the parties fail to account for an event, a desire to cooperate
and to share the loss will allow for subsequent adjustments. See Gillette, Commercial
Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term Contracts, 69 MINN. L. REV. 521,559-
71(1985).
7. The Uniform Commercial Code excuses performance of a contract where
performance has been made commercially impracticable "by the occurrence of a
contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract
was made." U.C.C. § 2-615 (1987). Comment 4 to U.C.C. § 2-615 notes that
"[i]ncreased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost is due to
some unforeseen contingency." See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 261 (1979). For application of the doctrine of commercial impracticability see
Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Wright, J.).
8. See CORBIN, CONTRACTs § 1320 (1962); FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 9.5 (2d
ed, 1990).
9. See Gillette, supra note 6, at 570.
10. See F. KESSLER AND G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS CASES & MATERIALS 36-37
(L.C. 1970). This freedom represents our moral perspective on contracts; that is, one
should not be compelled to enter into agreement nor should one be compelled to
actually perform, one may instead pay damages. The notion that public policy will
interfere to force the making of a contract is quite limited. See Poughkeepsie Buying
Serv. v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc., 205 Misc. 982, 131 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct.
1954). The idea that specific performance will be required by the law also has limited
[Vol. 56
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/2
BANKRUPTCY JURISPRUDENCE
most transactions may act on private volition free from public coercion. Thus,
if a party regrets a bargain, that party alone may weigh the various options
and determine her course.
It is, however, understood that if she chooses to breach the contract she
is obligated to pay damages to the other party. These damages should put that
party in the position she would have been in if the contract had been
performed." In this way, contract law balances the regretting party's right
to get out of the contract with the other party's right to the benefit of her
bargain.
The availability of bankruptcy provides the regretting individual with an
additional alternative to performance: breach and cooperative modification.
Theoretically, a party does not consider bankruptcy because of changes in the
specific market context of a particular bargain. Rather, a party considers
bankruptcy because of changes in her financial situation which affect all
bargains into which she has entered.12 Though the reasons for considering
bankruptcy may differ from those for considering breach absent bankruptcy,
the results may be similar. The interests of the contracting parties and the
rights that they have established in contract are brought into conflict.
Bankruptcy serves as a mechanism which forces creditors to renegotiate and
modify the terms of the original bargain. The debtor's institution of
bankruptcy proceedings requires both parties to reassess their contract
expectations and modify their behavior according to the Bankruptcy Code's
prescriptions. Norms of behavior based on the Bankruptcy Code are imposed
on the private expectations of the contracting parties. Behavior which was
protected by the legal system before bankruptcy becomes legally intolerable--
following. Indeed it has become a truism of American contract law that specific
performance is an exceptional remedy not justified simply by the existence of a
promise to perform. See F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, supra note 10, at 991-94.
11. Placing the party in the position where she would be if performance occurred
is generally understood to be the objective of contract remedies whether they be
monetary damages or specific performance. See Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for
Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1145, 1150 (1970). This is also the objective
of the remedies as stated in the Uniform Commercial Code. U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1987).
Contract relief is understood to be prospective, carefully geared to place the party in
as good 4 position as if performance had occurred but careful not to place the party
in a better position than if performance had occurred. Though arguably inherently
speculative, the underlying goal of contract law is to put the aggrieved party in as good
a position as if the contract had been performed. This goal serves as the basis for
contract interpretation and providing for contract damages. See also Fuller & Perdue,
The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 53-57 (1936).
12. Indeed it may be the case in situations involving breach of a single contract
that the breaching party does so because of general market conditions rather than
dissatisfaction with one bargain.
1991)
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in. some cases retrospectively--once bankruptcy is declared.13 For example,
the creditor no longer can expect to sue for contract damages for the debtor's
failure to perform ai bargained. Likewise, the creditor can no longer avail
herself of the self-help collection methods routinely available at law under
ordinary circumstances. In these ways bankruptcy procedures conflict with the
rights and interests of the creditor as a contracting party.
Because most of these rights and interests are based on the contractarian
model, we can reasonably conclude that bankruptcy law may be inconsistent
with a strict contractarian view of contract law. Under the contractarian
model, the law attempts to reconcile conflicting rights by compensating both
parties' expectations, either personal or reasonable. If bankruptcy law is to be
effective it must reconcile the conflict in rights which occurs when a party
declares bankruptcy. The contractarian model, however, may not provide the
proper framework for this reconciliation.
In bankruptcy, the conflict which occurs differs from that in an ordinary
breach of contract case. The conflict arising in bankruptcy is between private
expectations or rights and Code-created expectations and rights. The rights
or expectations granted by the Bankruptcy Code are better characterized as
public rather than private.'4 Thus, the law must reconcile conflict between
private and public expectations and between acceptable private behavior and
public standards of behavior.15 Bankruptcy, like any state-imposed negotia-
tion, should attempt to achieve some purposes of the parties as well as some
aims of the state. Its primary purpose, however, is public. 16 Moreover,
because its aim is primarily public rather than private, the utilitarian contract
model is a more appropriate model for developing and interpreting bankruptcy
law.
Yet while its purpose is utilitarian, an examination of the Code's structure
reveals a movement to a private law model. Thus, while there is a general
consistency in the policies of bankruptcy law and the structure of the Code,
there are some inconsistencies in the structure and interpretation. Where the
private law model is adopted by the Code it is more consistent with the
contractarian paradigm. In sum, the Code which was enacted to accomplish
one set of goals may be drafted and interpreted to accomplish another.
13. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 363(c)(1)-(2), 501, 504, 508, 542 (1988).
14. See infra notes 37-82 and accompanying text.
15. See Jackson, Translating Assets and Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Forum, 14
J. OF LEGAL STUD. 73, 75-77 (1985); Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 955-76.
16. For a discussion of the correctness of coerced bargaining in the context of
labor relations, see Comment, Appropriateness for Bargaining: A New Coverage




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/2
BANKRUPTCY JURISPRUDENCE
Analyzing Chapter 7 claims for discharge exposes the tension between
the private expectations of the parties and the public expectations which allow
relief from debts. The question arises whether modern bankruptcy law
sufficiently harmonizes the selfish interests of contracting parties with the
altruistic objectives of the state. This Article looks at the substance of the
Bankruptcy Code's policies and the Code's structure to determine how it
attempts to reconcile these two ideals. As exemplified in the Code's
exemption scheme, the Bankruptcy Code begins in principle from a public law
model with goals of equity and fairness to the individual claiming relief.. To
achieve these goals the Code adopts strict normative rules to govern
debtor/creditor behavior. As applied, bankruptcy law progresses to a private
law model which adopts standards of behavior based on goals of the
individual. These standards of behavior demand greater flexibility of the Code
to accommodate individual expectations. Often, the expressed, rhetorical goals
of bankruptcy law, which generally espouse collectivistic principles, are
replaced in practice by ideals that can only be characterized as individualistic.
This Article concludes that this interpretation of the Code is inconsistent
with its stated policies. The structure does not lend itself to achieving those
policies. Moreover, while some individualistic ideals must be considered
under the Code, the Code's exemption scheme has ignored its altruistic
purposes. Finally, much of the criticism of the Code is due not only to this
inconsistency but also to the fact that-the Code drafters, the courts, and the
critics are unclear in two areas: first, whether Bankruptcy law should address
situations of individual economic regret; and second, whether it should
develop to address broad economic failure.
Part II of this Article discusses the fresh start and equal access policies
of the Code; their histories; how they are integrated into the provisions of the
Code; and how they deviate from the policies promoted by contract law and
other doctrines related to bankruptcy. Turning to the Code's exemption
scheme, Part III discusses the Bankruptcy Code's definition of estate property,
generally, and whether pension funds are estate property, specifically. Part III
examines the relationship of the Code's definition of estate property to the
Code's fresh start and equal access policies. It also looks at the structure used
to define the exceptions and exemptions to the definitions. This portion of the
Article demonstrates the structural progression of these provisions from a
"strict rule form" to a "standards form." Part IV discusses the ideological
progression of the Code from a public interest model, as espoused in its
underlying policies, to a private expectation model, as exemplified in its
exemption scheme. Part IV also relates the structural progression to the
ideological progression. 7
17. For purposes of discussion consider the hypothetical case of Dr. Jonna Erick,
a thirty-eight year old medical professional. Dr. Erick has an income of approximately
1991]
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$75,000 per year. She is an independent health care provider who shares physical
facilities with several other physicians. She participates in an ERISA qualified group
pension plan and has a separate KEOGH plan. She has one dependent. Her debts are
the result of starting her business and shortly thereafter assuming the marital debts in
a divorce settlement which occurred in January 1987.
In March of 1987, Dr. Erick began considering the possibility of filing
bankruptcy. In May of that year she consulted an attorney who advised her on Chapter
7 and Chapter 13 ramifications. In April of 1987 she filed under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Act. In July of 1987 Dr. Erick transferred $100,000 to her KEOGH
account from savings accounts and money market accounts. In September of 1987 she
borrowed $30,000 from the account and refinanced a mortgage on her home making
a $10,000 down payment on the home. In October she repaid the money borrowed
from the account at a market interest rate. In December of 1987, Dr. Erick transferred
$50,000 to her KEOGH plan and $150,000 to her ERISA retirement plan. The
$200,000 represented proceeds from jewelry, automobiles, and commercial real estate
property which Dr. Erick owned.
Dr. Erick claims that the funds in the retirement plans and her home are not
property within the Bankruptcy Code and are beyond the trustee's reach during the
bankruptcy proceedings. Dr. Erick further claims that if the funds and income from
the pension fund are not excluded from the estate property, they are exempt under
section 522(d)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code. First, we will consider the validity of Dr.
Erick's claims and then the implications of such claims for the creditors of Dr. Erick.
In 1986 Dr. Erick, the party who will become the debtor in a bankruptcy
proceeding, was faced with an initial dilemma. Should she perform as per the terms
of her credit agreements? That is, should she make payment to her creditors or should
she default? Some of the transactions upon which she must decide were undoubtedly
secured by collateral in the debtor's possession. Others were no doubt unsecured.
Supplies, services and perhaps some medical equipment were provided to the debtor
on an unsecured basis on a number of contracts. These parties, both unsecured and
secured, are thus awaiting the performance of the debtor. It is the unsecured creditor
who is the concern of this Article. The unsecured party relies principally on income
from the debtor's operation as the source of its return performance. Dr. Erick will
probably conclude that a Chapter 7 liquidation is an attractive alternative for her. She
will not have to establish that she is unable to repay her debts over time nor that the
circumstances which caused her to regret the bargains entered into were tinforeseen or
beyond the contemplation of the parties. Also because of the increased resort to
bankruptcy, generally, the social stigma which may have at one time attached to this
choice no longer exists. She will be able to pay a portion of her debt to all of her
unsecured creditors and will be relieved from the threat of collection on any that
remain. As she is some years from retirement and enjoys an above average income,
the threat of the unavailability of credit for seven years is lessened. Finally, she will
be able to protect some of her property through the exclusions and exemptions
provided by the Code or by state exemption schemes. If she must resort to the Code
she is likely to protect $7500 interest in her homestead, unmatured life insurance and
her pension funds. The level of protection afforded her pension funds will vary
depending on whether the bankruptcy court concludes that the pensions are excluded
[Vol. 56
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II. THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW
Contract law since the latter half of the eighteenth century and as we
study it today is concerned primarily with the enforcement of executory
promises.18 The law developed under the influences of the free market's
growth and a laissez-faire political and social philosophy.' 9 The free market
society has aptly been described as very much a market for individuals.
Yet society generally and contract law specifically was not free of other
influences. Indeed the presence of other influences may have resulted from
too great an emphasis on the free market. The harshness of life that resulted
from the free market economy caused "the new middle classes" to develop
checks on freedom of choice and freedom of contract. Thus, the values and
laws of the individualistic society as espoused by Adam Smith21 and Thomas
Hobbes22 coexisted with ideas of collectivism as later promoted by John
Stuart Mill.'
Out of this era, two approaches of contract law, collectivistic and
individualistic might have developed. In fact, what developed was an
individualistic approach to contract law. The collectivistic ideas that were a
part of the law were defined as outside of contract law. Contract law thus
began to reflect the needs of the free market.24 The two models, both based
on the philosophers' ideas of what was best for the individual have been
called the contractarian paradigm and the utilitarian paradigm.2
or exempted property. If she is a resident of a state which has opted out of the federal
scheme, she may have a greater or lesser protection for her assets. If she is a resident
of Oklahoma, for example, she may protect from the bankruptcy proceeding her entire
interest in her home and any interest in a tax exempt pension plan including her
KEOGH plan. See OKLA. STAT. TIT. 31, §§ 1-2 (1980). Nonetheless she may protect
any money she has converted to these plans just prior to her declaration. Thus,
bankruptcy seems a reasonable and likely alternative for Dr. Erick.
18. While this statement may seem all but self evident, it did not always represent
prevailing legal thought. Early contract law emphasized certain types of contracts and
relationships and executed promises. Executory promises were not enforceable at
contract. See P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACr, 308-309.
19. Id. at 233-35.
20. Id.
21. 2 A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 19-26 (0. Zeller rev. ed. 1963) (4th ed. 1811).
22. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 115-446 (A. Waller rev. ed. 1904) (1st ed. 1651).
23. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (S. Collini rev. ed. 1989) (1st ed. 1859).
24. Atiyah, supra note 18, at 399.
25. See Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classical
Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IowA L. REV. 769 (1985). Rosenfeld
also discusses a third paradigm, libertarian which he describes as lying "next to
1991]
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The contractarian paradigm is the prevailing scheme for contract law as
it has developed under the free market theory. It is based on the view of the
precedents of individual self interests. It recognizes, however, that the
cooperation of society is necessary in order to enhance the value of individual
achievement and, ultimately, individual self interest.m This cooperation is
achieved through the law by a recognition of the voluntary agreements
between contracting parties. Under this paradigm, the individual is not only
allowed freedom of contract, but also is fully protected by legal enforcement
of the promise. '  Absent procedural unfairness, promises are enforced.
Because the paradigm assumes that maximum individual welfare is achieved
through freedom of contract, law is not to interfere with that freedom even to
achieve what may be characterized as a "common good."2 In other words,
promotion of individual self interests, such as the right to enforce a bargain,
is the best way to achieve the common good.
The utilitarian paradigm is based on a combination of beliefs in the rights
of individuals and the collective good. Under this paradigm, the law serves
as an impartial judge to determine from the perspective of each party whether
a contract should be enforced.29 In contrast to the contractarian paradigm
which is concerned most with process, utilitarianism is concerned with fairness
in result. According to John Stuart Mill, whose works have been character-
ized as utilitarian,3°"[a]s soon as any part of a person's conduct affects
prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the
question whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by
interfering with it, becomes open to discussion. 31  Thus, the question of
enforcement of a contract which would affect the interests of society in
general is an open question, even though it impacts on the rights of the
extreme individualism." Id. at 786. Its purpose is to insure that individuals, through
contract law and other law, be able to maintain the fruit of their own labor free from
interference from the society around them. Id. at 787.
26. Id. at 790-93. According to Professor Rosenfeld the contractarian paradigm
originated from the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes who recognized the need for
cooperation among men lest human affairs degenerate to a state of war. Though
Hobbes perceived the need for a "sovereign" in order to prevent war and to preserve
man, the purpose of the "sovereign" was to protect the right to live as individuals. See
HOBBES, supra note 22, at 115-19.
27. According to Hobbes while "men" had a natural right to make covenants, the
only way they were freed of such was either by performance or by being forgiven.
HOBBES, supra note 22, at 92-95.
28. See Rosenfeld, supra note 25, at 798.
29. Id. at 801
30. Id. at 798.
31. See J.S. MILL, supra note 23, at 56-74.
[Vol. 56
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contracting parties. 2 Accordingly, injury to society can require the law's
interference in contract enforcement. 3 Under the utilitarian paradigm of
contract law, justice is determined by "weighing the consequences of all
actions to determine whether they contribute to the common good."34 Unlike
the contract model, in the utilitarian paradigm, individual good does not
determine common good. Common good restrains individual good.
Both the contractarian and the utilitarian paradigms are philosophies for
achieving justice and resolving issues in contract law. The following section
argues that because insolvency has its most profound effect on contract
rights,35bankruptcy law as an interference with contract rights should be
guided by a contract law model.36 Furthermore, the utilitarian paradigm
represents the most appropriate philosophy for achieving justice in bankruptcy
law.
III. UNDERLYING POLICIES OF THE CODE
Long-stated and basic purposes of modern bankruptcy law are to "relieve
the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness 37 alid to give
"the honest but unfortunate debtor ... a new opportunity in life and a clear
field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of
preexisting debt."38 The Bankruptcy Act was passed "in light of those views
and [is] to be construed, when possible, in harmony with them." 39 This
rhetoric has been translated into two policies of Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code: (1) the free access policy, and (2) the fresh start policy. These policies
reflect the collectivistic principles from which they stem.
32. It should be noted that Mill recognized the right of an individual to engage
in conduct which affected himself or herself alone as a "perfect right." However, Mill
apparently recognized that very little conduct would not have consequences which
affected others. Thus his critics have accused him of sacrificing individual autonomy
to societal needs. See Rosenfeld, supra note 25, at 803.
33. J.S. MILL, supra note 23, at 94-115. Bankruptcy law is a form of interference
in the contract rights of parties as will be discussed in the following section.
34. Rosenfeld, supra note 25, at 802-03.
35. See CHITY ON CONTRACrS, §§ 1213-31 (A. Guest 2d ed. 1977), in which
the author characterizes the adjudication of bankruptcy as an assignment by operation
of law of the contract rights of a debtor.
36. See Warren, supra note 1, at 778-80.
37. Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549,554-55 (1914).
Cf Jackson, Bankruptcy, Nonbankruptcy, Entitlements and the Creditors' Bargain, 91
YALE L.J. 857 (1982).
38. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934); Lines v. Frederick, 400
U.S. 18, 19 (1970).
39. Frederick, 400 U.S. at 19.
1991]
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A. The Free Access Policy
The Bankruptcy Code's adherence to the free access policy means that
discharge in bankruptcy is available with few substantive or procedural
limitations. Debtors eligible for relief in bankruptcy are those persons who
reside, have a domicile, or own property in the United States.40 Individuals
who find themselves in financial distress need not be insolvent to qualify to
file for Chapter 7 discharge in bankruptcy. 41 With the exception of stockbro-
kers and commodity brokers, 4 any person may be eligible for Chapter 7
discharge without a finding that the debtor is unable to pay. 3 The individual
need only be a person who has not obtained a discharge under Chapter 7 in
the previous six years. 4 As applied to a bargain disrupted by bankruptcy,
the only apparent requirement for access to the process is individual,
subjective regret on the part of the debtor. Thus, the creditor's right to expect
the debtor's performance is interfered with when the debtor elects bankruptcy.
Once the debtor decides to declare bankruptcy, the law disregards in many
ways the terms for which the parties bargained.
Notwithstanding this disruption of the parties' expectations in contract
law, the Bankruptcy Code places few limitations on the debtor's basis for
opting for bankruptcy rather than performing the credit agreements. A wide
range of reasons for regret, from bad faith in the initial agreement to
unforeseeable catastrophic changes, might exist.45  First, the debtor, in
agreeing to the credit terms, may have done so with no intention of perform-
ing. The party may have based such a decision on the legal limitations on
remedies for breach, the cost of collection processing, and the bankruptcy law
and policy. The party, who may have already accumulated substantial debt,
may foresee that bankruptcy and related non-bankruptcy law reduces the cost
of his non-performance by requiring the creditor to accept less than the rate
agreed upon in the original exchange. This debtor thus makes a calculated
decision to enter an agreement knowing she will get out of the bargain by
declaring bankruptcy. Under pure contractarian principles, this debtor would
not be allowed to declare bankruptcy and thwart the creditor's right to collect.
The private expectations of the 6reditor created by the law on debt collection
and general contract principles would require adherence to the' reasonable
40. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1988).
41. Id. § 301.
42. Id. § 109(d).
43. Id. §§ 109(b), 109(d).
44. Id. § 727(a)(8).
45. See Countryman, Improvident Credit Extension: A New Legal Concept
Aborning?, 27 ME. L. REV. 1 (1975).
[Vol. 56
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terms. The right of the creditor to enforce the contract against this calculating
debtor prevails under the contractarian approach.
The party who contracts knowing bankruptcy will follow presents one
extreme in consumer transactions. The other extreme is represented by the
party who cannot perform a contract entered into as a result of creditor
coercion.' She ill-advisedly agrees to a credit transaction which either
contains unfair terms, terms she did not understand, or terms she cannot
comply with given her financial circumstances. As she begins to perform she
discovers that she is unable to complete the terms of the agreement.
Extension of credit under these circumstances is curtailed by general principles
of contract law. The common law doctrine of unconscionability, and various
consumer protection acts, however, allow extensions to continue to occur.47
The improvident debtor may have had every intention of performing the
agreed-upon credit transaction. Bankruptcy, however, may become the least
costly alternative because the debtor, out of ignorance, naivete or fraud on the
part of the creditor, has been unable to fully assess her own ability to
perform.' Protecting a "hypothetical bargain" with the unscrupulous creditor
would not seem appropriate. Even under the contractarian paradigm, the
improvident debtor would be allowed to avoid the contract because of the
unfairness of the procedure leading to the contract formation. It is question-
able, however, whether the improper procedure employed by one creditor
might in fact support avoiding other contracts with the same creditor.
The majority of the individuals who declare bankruptcy do not fit into
either of the above classes. Most parties who regret their bargains and are
faced with a decision of performing or claiming bankruptcy fall between the
two extremes. The.majority of debtors face the choice of bankruptcy because
of a combination of two factors: impulsive behavior upon entering into the
agreement; and failed or changed circumstances between contract formation
and contract performance.49
One theory explaining consumer regret is as follows. As consumers
many of us develop a plan for purchasing items whether they are necessities
or luxuries. As a complement to the planning side of our'personality there is
an impulsive side to each individual. Depending on the individual, the
availability of credit may cause the impulsive element to take over the
planning element. Thus, to some extent the impulse credit-buyer does so
46. Id. at 2-3. See also Whitford, A Critique of the Consumer Credit Collection
System, WIs. L. REV. 1047 (1979).
47. See Whitford, supra note 46, at 1103.
48. See Countryman, supra note 45, at 6-7 (citing The Thacher Report,
STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM, S. Doc. No. 65, 72nd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1932)).
49. See Whitford, supra note 46, at 1103.
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without rationally assessing the possibility or likelihood of performance."
The debtor probably intends at the time of contracting to perform. Changes
in circumstances, such as job status, prior to completion of the performance
cause the debtor to regret the impulse purchase. In some cases, where the
impulse transaction could reasonably be performed as bargained, the changed,
unanticipated circumstances are so severe as to precipitate a decision not to
perform. In other cases, where performance of the impulse transaction was
highly unlikely at the outset, regret may occur much earlier and may be based
on a less severe change in circumstances. Nevertheless, the party begins to
regret the agreement and non-performance either by default, or declaration of
bankruptcy becomes an option. The two factors vary as to the influence they
have on the decision to declare bankruptcy.51
The free access policy fails to distinguish the debtor who never intends
to perform, the debtor who is a victim of an unscrupulous creditor, and the
debtor who is a victim of circumstances.52 In this way the Bankruptcy Code
differs from much of modern contract law which follows the contractarian
paradigm and allows differing results based on the faith of the party making
the claim for dissolution of contract.53 The Bankruptcy Code treats the
impulsive debtor, the willful debtor, and the thoughtful debtor the same.54
50. See Jackson, The Fresh Start Policy of Bankruptcy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393,
1404-1414 (1985). There is evidence that credit cards represent a particularly
attractive form of credit to people who declare bankruptcy. In addition, the high
interest, short term nature of credit card debt increases its impact on the financial
status of the debtor. See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, As WE FORGIVE OUR
DEBTORS 188-90 (1989).
51. Evidence' suggests that a significant number of debtors who declare
bankruptcy suffer employment interruption or decline in income in the two year period
prior to declaration of Chapter 7 bankruptcy. See SULLIVAN, supra note 50, at 98-102.
52. The definition of debtor found in 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1988), is "any person or
municipality concerning which a case under this title has been commenced." 11
U.S.C. § 109(a) (1988). The definition of "[w]ho may be a debtor" includes any
person who now resides in the United States and for purposes of filing under Chapter
7, any person "if such is not (1) a railroad; (2) a domestic insurance company or
[member of the domestic banking industry] per the terms of section 109(b)." Thus,
the distinction made in the Code between debtors focuses on the domicile or residence
of the person filing and on the nature of the business in which the debtor is engaged.
For purposes of filing under Chapter 13, section 109(e) distinguishes between debtors
based on the size of the secured and unsecured debt. 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1988).
53. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1988) excepts some debts from discharge but relates to false
presentations or by use of a material false written statement. This section looks only
at limited objective manifestations of bad faith to determine ineligibility.
54. Unless some inference may be drawn between the distinctions found in section
109 with regard to the manner in which they become debtors, were are left to conclude
that the Code is not concerned whether persons meeting the requirements of section
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The free access policy refuses to judge the merit of the claim being brought
even though the acceptance of that claim means a disruption of some private
interest and a public interference into the agreement. 55 For these reasons, the
free access policy introduces a conflict between bankruptcy law and the
expectations of the creditor based on contractarianism. Indeed, this bankrupt-
cy policy arguably goes beyond the ideas of collectivism.
Upon initial observation, contract law appears to base rules governing
breach and remedies on a standard of individual expectation rather than a
collective standard of good or bad behavior." Under modern contract law,
at least in theory, a party who willfully breaches a contract is no more liable
for damages than an innocent breacher" Contract law assumes that in a
truly consensual relationship, parties are free to agree to almost any terms.
Parties are also free to choose to either perform or to breach if they are
willing to pay damages for the breach.58 Furthermore, contract law assumes
remedies for such breach will be based on the bargain between the parties and
the reasonably-expected result of that bargain. Concerns about willfulness or
innocence of the breaching party at the time 6f breach have limited utility in
determining damages based on the expectations of the parties at the time the
contract was made 9 The question which allows the adjudicator to reduce
or expand damages is whether the expectations of the parties were reasonable.
"Reasonable expectations," however, are often governed by the good faith
standard of contract performance. This governance allows a court to interject
collective constraints and speak in a language with moral implications6
Yet to some degree, even this level of morality in contract law is based
on individualism, particularly where the parties involved are merchants. For
example, damages for breach are based on the good faith expectation of the
109 become debtors willfully or inadvertently.
55. The private distribution of the assets available to the estate which may have
been contemplated by the creditor are now subject to the collective process described
by Jackson, Translating Assets and Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Forum, 14 J. LEG.
STuD. 73 (1985).
56. Legal remedies for breach of contract reject compulsion of certain behavior
as an objective of the system. See Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 1150. See also
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685,
1693-94 (1976).
57. But see Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 1150-53, who, while recognizing this
is the theoretical basis for contract damages identifies a punishment element in the
assessment of remedies for breach of contract.
58. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 462 (1897).
59. See Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 128 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921)
(opinion of Cardozo, J.).
60. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 58, at 463; U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 2-103 (1987);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).
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nonbreaching party who is under a duty to mitigate her losses. A sort of
commercial morality is thus imposed. Bad behavior or behavior which
reduces compensation is not the result of some inherent wrong, but results
from the failure of the nonbreaching party to behave in a commercially-
reasonable way on an objective level.61 To the extent that this standard is
a collective standard, it is based on the community of merchants, not the
society in general. The outcome is that the party who fails to mitigate is not
compensated per her personal expectations; instead she is compensated for
what the merchant community believes her expectations should have been.
When the issue shifts from how much a party can collect in damages to
whether the contract rights of parties should be avoided, morality is interjected
into commercial law on a somewhat different basis. On this level the
interjection is based on collective concerns about the utility of individual
behavior. Consequently, even though the parties' expectations are capable of
being fulfilled, the court may refuse to grant those expectations. The law
bases its concept of bad behavior on some collective or public notion of right
and wrong--apart from commercial reasonableness. Good faith in this context
takes on a new role and often requires interference with the private process of
commercial law.
Unconscionability, duress, misrepresentation and impracticability are
doctrines which courts utilize to avoid privately-negotiated contracts. Each
doctrine turns on an element of good faith on the part of the person seeking
avoidance, and bad faith on the part of the person seeking performance.
Under each doctrine, good faith or bad faith is defined by a concern for justice
that goes beyond concern for fulfillment of individuals' rights to contract or
concerns about individual welfare as defined by the individual.62 The
Bankruptcy Code, under the free access policy, is not as concerned with
specific individual welfare as it is with public ideas about justice and
equity.63
One distinction between the collectivist principles as applied in contract
law and those of bankruptcy law is that bad faith is not a concern in
bankruptcy. Another distinction is that contract law looks at the problems on
61. See Kennedy, supra note 56, at 1694-99. See also Roth Steel Prod. v. Sharon
Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1983), in which the court recognizes not only the
objective measure of good faith employing the commercial reasonableness standard but
also the subjective measure of good faith and asks the question of whether the party
was honest in fact in its claim modification of a contract was made in good faith.
62. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1987); FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, § 4.28.
63. The Bankruptcy Code treats parties seeking Chapter 7 discharge not as a
composite of all regretting debtors but rather as individual "innocent" debtors. 11
U.S.C. § 727 (1988). See Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REv. 131, 135
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a case by case basis and affects only one exchange at a time. Bankruptcy
policy has greater potential for disrupting the private expectations on a broader
scale.64
Arguably from a market-expectation perspective, the free access policy's
failure to make distinctions between the various types of debtors is irrelevant.
The results of a willful refusal to pay are the same as an inability to pay.
Whether bankruptcy is considered as an alternative to performance at the point
of obtaining credit or whether it is considered as an alternative to performance
as the result of changed circumstances has no bearing. From a monetary
standpoint, the effect on the rights of creditors is the same in either situation
except that it may affect the debtor's choice of the timing of the institution of
bankruptcy. Yet because the availability of bankruptcy as an alternative to
performance is based on altruistic rather than market goals, the free access
policy must be justified by something other than the indifference of the market
to the motives of the bankrupt. If the goal is to provide the honest unfortu-
nates with relief, arguably some concern with specific individual condition
'should be observed. Psychological and sociological costs associated with
bankruptcy will increase or decrease the desirability of bankruptcy to some
parties who otherwise may be able to perform.
To the extent the Bankruptcy Code can distinguish between the "honest"
and "unfortunate" debtor and the willful breacher and at the same time
approximate the monetary benefits anticipated by creditor, these goals should
be reflected in the Code'9 access policy. The individual's particular
circumstance in choosing bankruptcy as an alternative to performance should
be the focus of the policy governing access to discharge because individual
relief is the underlying goal of the Code.65 If the goal of the Code is to
provide relief to the debtor from oppressive economic situations, access
considerations should include not only the amount owed in debt and the assets
available for distribution, but also the ability to earn. These considerations are
the essence of what constitutes oppression for this individual. This framework
is the essence of contractarianism in the context of the bankruptcy access
policy.
Yet some observations based on empirical study suggest that most
individuals who declare bankruptcy are unable to pay. Furthermore, specific
inquiry beyond present standards into debtor motivation would be ineffi-
cient.' The empirical evidence suggests that the case by case method
64. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1988).
65. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
66. See Sullivan, supra note 50, at 53-77. This data suggests that most debtors
who declare bankruptcy cannot afford to pay creditors.
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employed in a contractarian approach is not necessary or desirable to affect
the goal of providing relief to the honest but unfortunate debtor. 67
The drafters of the free access policy must have determined that relieving
the debtor from "oppressive indebtedness" is so important that no distinctions
should be made at the level of access. Discharge in bankruptcy as a matter
of right is not justified by the market or its relationship with general principles
of the law regulating market exchange. Bankruptcy discharge, therefore, does
not fit into the contractarian paradigm. The rhetoric of and the purposes
behind the Bankruptcy Code with regard to access are utilitarian. Hence,
results must be judged on the achievement of utilitarian goals.
B. Fresh Start Policy
As the free access policy represents debtors' introduction to the Code's
protection, the fresh start policy represents the results of the proceedings.
Like the free -access policy, the policy of allowing the debtor to achieve a
"fresh start" after bankruptcy proceedings reduces the cost of the debtor's non-
performance and artificially determines the bargaining positions of parties to
a contract. Both free access and fresh start are granted as a matter of right,
and both are arguably overinclusive. The fresh start policy of Chapter 7,
which is complete and nonwaiveable, provides the debtor with relief from his
existing debts in exchange for surrender and liquidation of existing assets.6
Oddly enough, originally the Bankruptcy Code used the process of surrender
and liquidation as a way of getting the regretting debtor to disclose all of her
assets.69 One of the currently-stated normative purposes of surrender and
liquidation is protecting the debtor's assets from further collection efforts70
by the preventing creditors from racing to the debtor's assets and looting the
bankruptcy fund.7' Because it alleviates some of the economic consequences
of nonperformance to the debtor, the policy further enhances the option of
bankruptcy over breach.
67. See Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, Limiting access to Bankruptcy Discharge:
An Analysis for the Creditor's Data, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1091, in which the authors
analyze a study of Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings aimed at analyzing the reasons parties
declare bankruptcy and their ability to repay debts which would be discharged under
Chapter 7. The authors conclude that the evidence produced by -the study failed to
support reform which would disallow discharges different from those currently
employed by the Code. Id. at 1146.
68. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1988).
69. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446-47 (1973).
70. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(c) (1988).
71. See Jackson, Bankruptcy, Nonbankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditor's
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982).
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The resort to bankruptcy is thus promoted as a viable alternative to the
debtor based on economics alone. First, the fresh start policy allows the
debtor to be freed completely from the obligation upon conclusion of the
bankruptcy proceeding. Where the amount a creditor will receive in a
proceeding is less than what the creditor was to receive under the agreement,
there will always be an economic disincentive to perform per the agreement
or to risk a similar amount per a damage award. The following discussions
merely touch upon the issue. There are several factors which will determine
whether the creditor is likely to gain less through bankruptcy than through
performance or judgment.72 Two factors that merit some discussion are first,
the debtor's unsecured debt-to-asset ratio; and second, the debtor's income.
Simply stated, the debt-to-asset ratio will typically be consistent with the
proportional share that the non-secured creditor can expect. For example, if
the debtor has available property worth $30,000 and debts of $45,000, each
unsecured creditor who files a timely claim will receive payment of 2/3 of its
debt. 73 If the debtor has more assets than debts, the debtor will not likely
claim bankruptcy. However, the fresh start policy does not distinguish
between the debtor whose ratio is 3:2 and the debtor whose debt-to-asset ratio
is 10:1. In other words, discharge without recourse by the creditor occurs
whether 66 percent of the debt is paid or 10 percent of the debt is paid. Yet,
if the situation were left to private processes, the creditors and the debtor
might bargain differently under these situations. 74
Secondly, no distinction is made between creditors with new debts and
creditors with substantially-paid debts. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the
creditor with a long-term contract is treated no differently than a short-term
creditor, when economically they are in quite different positions. The fresh
start policy artificially ends the term of the agreement prior to both parties'
expectations and prior to any term a party would renegotiate on the market.
In sum, the policy fails in application to make distinctions between debtors or
creditors. It is completely inconsistent with the contractarian paradigm. It is,
however, quite consistent with utilitarian principles.
Unlike typical contract damages which attempt to compensate the
nonbreaching party, the fresh start policy ignores performance and compen-
sates based on the non-performer's assets."5 Theoretically, where the creditor
72. For an indepth analysis of the creditor's cost of collection and the efficiency
of the collection process see Leff, supra note 63, at 132-42. The process employed
by the Bankruptcy Code may benefit creditors by providing a more efficient joint
system of collection. See Jackson, supra note 71, at 859-62.
73. 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1988), provides that claims will be paid on a pro rata basis.
74. Thus unsecured creditors are treated the same, not only within individual cases
but from bankruptcy case to bankruptcy case.
75. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (1988), provides that the debtor must turn over property
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has performed and the debtor is faced with either paying according to the
agreement or paying somewhat less, the debtor will opt for the latter. Though
the focus of bankruptcy is on the ability of the nonperforming party to pay the
debt, the Bankruptcy Code arguably loses that focus in the fresh start policy.
It ignores the availability of the debtor's future income to support performance
or to substitute for credit once discharge is granted.76 Declaration of
bankruptcy absolutely cuts off access to the debtor's income.
For illustrative purposes let's assume Debtor A has a debt-to-asset ratio
of 3:2 as does Debtor B. Debtor A has an income of $30,000; Debtor B has
an income of $10,000. Both debtors' income are exempt from trustee
recovery, assuming that both A and B have the same number of dependents.
After bankruptcy the value of getting credit for B is going to be greater than
for A because A has more at risk than does B. Also, if inability to get credit
is a cost of bankruptcy, then the cost to A is greater than the cost to B. Yet
under the fresh start policy, Debtors B and A are treated the same. A's added
advantage from bankruptcy is not compensated by requiring A to make
additional payment to his creditors above the amount which Debtor B must
make.' Again, this distinction is irrelevant except from a contractarian
position where the focus is on the hypothetical bargain between specific
individual debtors and creditors. This approach of the fresh start policy can
be justified, however, from a collectivistic standpoint. One justification is that
by being allowed to regain her position in society, the debtor contributes to
the community as a productive member. This benefit far outweighs the
benefit to creditors and the community that holding the debtor to the debt
would yield.
In addition to the economic benefits to society, certain psychological
benefits are attained by the fresh start policy. The psychological and
sociological benefits perhaps justify the policy more completely than the
economic benefits. 78 Arguably, a modified policy which distinguished
between A and B above could also achieve the same psychological and
sociological benefits. Yet, because the evidence shows that most debtors are
or the value of property as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988). Further, 11 U.S.C.
§ 726 (1988), provides for distribution of that property for payment of claims as
submitted by creditors. The focus is not on what the debtor owes her creditors but on
what the estate can afford to pay the debtor's creditors.
76. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(3) (1988) prohibits a creditor from commencing an action
or continuing an action to hold a bankrupt personally liable or to collect against
property that is acquired after the commencement of the bankrupt's claim. A debtor's
future income is also beyond her creditor's reach. Id.
77. One author suggests that a discharge plan which allowed for payment over a
period of time might take income or ability to pay into account. See Eisenberg, supra
note 1, at 977-81.
78. See Jackson, supra note 71, at 1405-24.
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similar in their ability repay debts, making distinctions may be meaningless
or at best inefficient.
C. Rights vs. Standards in Bankruptcy Policy
Both the fresh start policy and free access policy are stated as absolute
rules of the Bankruptcy Code. 9 With limited exception, the law requires
that a party seeking discharge under Chapter 7 receive absolute and nonwaive-
able discharge."0 Parties to Chapter 7 proceedings are not allowed to waive
discharge for some debts but not others or to allocate risks based on their
current status and their original expectations. 81 Both the free access and the
fresh start policies are structured as rules which do not distinguish between
debtors or creditors; both interject the concept of collectivism or altruism into
the expectations of the parties; both serve to reduce the cost of non-perfor-
mance in relation to performance or breach; and both increase the likelihood
that the regretting party will elect to pursue bankruptcy. In sum, neither the
substance nor the form of the policies as they appear in the Code are
consistent with contractarian principles.
The absolute right of free access and to a fresh start evokes the argument
of undue interference with the process of commercial renegotiations. We'
could conceive of a different fresh start policy which incorporated some of the
concerns of parties entering into credit agreements or settlements.8 2 One
might also conceive of an access policy which required proof of merit, good
faith, or reasonableness.83 Under such a policy, the access to and outcome
of bankruptcy would be determined by ability to meet certain standards either
on a subjective or objective basis.Y4 Policy as currently stated reduces the
79. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1988).
80. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1988) states that a court shall grant a debtor a discharge
unless the debtor is not an individual. The inference to be drawn from this language
is that individuals presumably have a right to discharge of the debts. Though section
727 further states some limitations on this right, it is presumed that unless those
limitations are established in each case involving an individual, discharge will be
granted.
81. Bankruptcy's fresh start policy may be looked at as a risk allocation or a cost
minimization device. Neither view, however, fully supports the method of implement-
ing the policy as a nonwaiveable right. See Jackson, supra note 71, at 1398. The
trustee has discretion to refuse to discharge certain debts. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(3),
(4) (1988).
82. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 955-60. See also Jackson, supra note 71, at
860-70.
83. Indeed the current policy allows for proof of bad faith to defend against a
claim for discharge.
84. We might ask for example whether a reasonable debtor in the position of this
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level of proof at the access and outcome points. The Code could leave the
standards of reasonableness to more specific issues such as will be discussed
later.' 5 The Code's adoption of a "rights" position over that of "reasonable-
ness" position in light of the circumstances can be justified as producing
greater certainty and efficiency in the initial and ending stages of the
process.86 The inconsistency in this argument is that efficiency and certainty
justifications are typically reserved for legal processes whose goals are market-
oriented not those whose goals are individual protection from "oppression."
More likely the current "rights" orientation is justified as the prevailing public
attitude toward the debtor who is a potential bankruptcy party.
The absolute right mode of implementing the purposes of bankruptcy
law is supported by the contractarian paradigm. It is also, however, supported
by collective goals of the present society. The combination of the two
policies means that any debtor can enter the process and is entitled to
complete discharge. While the impact of these two basic policies has led to
harsh criticism of the Code,87 such criticism ignores the utilitarian purposes
of the Code. As established in the following discussion, the conflict between
the underlying utilitarian principles and the desire to frame bankruptcy in
contractarian terms has led to applications of bankruptcy law which are
inconsistent with the policies of access and discharge as a matter of right.
IV. PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE
One critical question in bankruptcy is what is considered property of the
bankrupt party's estate. The question is critical because the answer determines
which assets will be used to pay debts. The analysis used in answering this
question illustrates how bankruptcy law moves from a public law rights model
to a private law standards model.
Once an individual files a Chapter 7 petition for discharge of her debts,
she must surrender all her property to the bankruptcy trustee for liquidation.8
The Bankruptcy Code allows the debtor to avoid the liquidation of property
in a number of ways. First, certain assets may be excluded from the definition
debtor would declare bankruptcy or whether this debtor is motivated in honesty by the
oppressive nature of her financial situation. Instead the Code allows complete access
and a fresh'start to anyone making the claim and shifts the burden to those objecting
to show that some bad faith element motivated the filing. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1988).
85. See infra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
86. While certainty within the process of bankruptcy may be effectuated by the
free access policy in the overall exchange transaction process, the alternative of
bankruptcy, if cost free, threatens the integrity of the exchange process.
87. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 976-99.
88. 11 U.S.C. § 542 (1988).
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of property of the estate by relevant state or federal law.89 Secondly, assets
which may come within the definition of property may be exempted from
recovery under federal or state law.90 Finally, the Bankruptcy Code allows
the debtor to transfer nonexempted property to exempt property on the eve of
bankruptcy.9'
Thus, if the party considering bankruptcy owns a home, that home would
likely be considered property per the Code's definition. The house may be
exempt, however, because of a state homestead exemption statute. Even if not
exempt, absent fraud, the Code allows the bankrupt to sell the property and
purchase exempt property.92 The following sections discuss the provisions
defining property and exemptions in light of their relevance to the regret
contingency and the debtor's decision to declare bankruptcy.
The exclusion or inclusion of assets available to the trustee for liquidation
has a profound impact on the value of bankruptcy relative to performance of
the contract.93 The Bankruptcy Code establishes a scheme to determine what
property will be subject to creditors claims and thereby limits available assets
for purposes of paying creditors. Because there is no established legal
definition of property, assets subject to liquidation could include intangible
property, such as human resources. 94 The broader the category of included
property the less attractive from a purely economic perspective bankruptcy
will be as an alternative; conversely, the more narrow the categories, the less
costly and more attractive bankruptcy is relative to performance.
Through its definition of property and express exemptions to that
definition, the Bankruptcy Code limits the assets available for recovery. The
Code also allows states to specifically exempt certain assets not specifically
excluded or exempted by the federal provisions.95 Thus, a party seeking to
89. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988).
90. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988).
91. See In re Swift, 72 Bankr. 563 (W.D. Okla. 1987); In re O'Brien, 67 Bankr.
317 (N.D. Iowa 1986).
92. See In re Reed, 700 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Swift, 72 Bankr. 563
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1987); In re Breuer; 68 Bankr. 48 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985); In
re Blum, 41 Bankr. 816 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984); In re Levine, 40 Bankr. 76 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1984).
93. If a party perceives that her property subject to surrender is larger than her
debts she will no doubt opt not to claim bankruptcy. This is because she does not
need the state to protect her interest; she is capable of protecting her own interests.
However, to the extent that she can protect her assets and start over with them intact
after the proceeding, bankruptcy is more attractive.
94. See Jackson, supra note 71, at 1431-34.
95. Under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988), the debtor may elect to exempt from
the estate any property exempt under federal law or state or local law that is applicable
at the date of the filing of the petition.
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protect assets has at least three chances to avoid their surrender. It is as
though the debtor, prior to bankruptcy, sits with one whole pie which
represents her total conceivible acquired assets. A substantial portion of the
pie is removed because the Code, through its fresh start policy, necessarily
excludes post-proceeding or future assets. A second portion of the pie is
removed because the Code excludes human capital from the definition of
accessible property found at section 541(a)(1).6 The pie is reduced by any
exclusion which may be provided for by federal bankruptcy law.97 The pie
is further reduced by exemptions provided by federal and state nonbankruptcy
law and state bankruptcy law. Thus the property which the individual debtor
must surrender may be only a slim portion of the debtor's assets.
The basis for limiting the recoverable assets relates ideas of public
concern for the individual rather than upholding private agreements.98 In
essence, the exclusion of certain property from the estate seems to return to
the debtor a protected property right in her assets over the creditor's rights in
contracts notwithstanding that the debtor, herself, willingly contracted away
the protection.
Excluded or exempted property includes, for example, future earnings,
specified pension funds, certain household assets and child support. 99 While
96. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988) reads as follows:
Property of the estate.
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of
this title creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the
following property, wherever located:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of
this section, all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property as of the commencement of the
case.
Id.
97. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988) which provides the Code's exemption scheme.
11 U.S.C. § 541(c) (1988) provides for the exclusion of certain property that may meet
the definition of property of the estate found in 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988).
98. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934), an early bankruptcy decision,
expressed this idea:
The powers of the individual to earn a living for himself and those
dependent upon him is in the nature of a personal liberty quite as much as,
if not more than, it is a property right. To preserve its free exercise is of
the utmost importance, not only because it is a fundamental private
necessity, but because it is a matter of great public concern.
Id. at 245.
99. For a discussion of how the Code excludes future earnings as property of the
estate available for distribution to creditors, see supra note 88-96 and accompanying
text. Certain pension benefits are exempt from inclusion in the estate by 11 U.S.C.
§§ 522(d)(10)(A), 522(d)(10)(E) (1988). Household assets are exempted from
[Vol. 56
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the exclusion of future earnings obviously is consistent with the fresh start
policy, the basis for the exclusion of future assets and human capital deserves
further discussion. The inclusions of future assets would undoubtedly increase
available property. Inclusion of future assets and human capital in the
definition of property, however, would be problematic for a number of
reasons.
One problem with attaching future assets is that they are mostly
uncertain. Current conventional assets are more easily established. The
difficulty of quantifying and valuing future assets and human capital presents
another justification for excluding both from the definition of property.
Present assets, generally, are more easily identified, and a market or resale
value is more easily attached to them. If future assets were included as part
of the estate, the question of how far into the future to extend coverage would
need to be addressed. This question creates even more uncertainty in the
process. The definition of property which closes the estate at the date of
filing has the advantages of certainty and finality. We might note that in the
exchange process a creditor attempts to ascertain the amount of human capital
and future earnings upon which it can rely for payment of the debt. The fact
that the debtor is declaring bankruptcy proves how unreliable such a process
can be for certain debtors. We could convincingly argue that the bankruptcy
should not engage in the same kind of speculation which has already proved
fallible for this debtor.
The failure to include human assets as well as future assets is defensible
on a number of mostly collectivistic bases. A blanket exclusion cannot be
defended from a contractarian perspective. The blanket exclusion, however,
ignores the fact that the debtor's as well as the creditor's decision to contract
on credit was based on future income and human capital. Even if the decision
were improvident, the parties' expectations at the time of contracting were that
future income would be taxed, and that the future income would result from
the use of available human capital. 1" A blanket exclusion by the Code
alters the parties' expectations in an arguably arbitrary manner. For example,
at the point of contracting, the factors for evaluating a party's ability to
perform include earnings over the term of the credit agreement. Also, future
earnings might be applied in the judgment for breach in the amount of
contract price."0' Such judgment could be obtained through garnishment of
the debtor's wages and future earnings. If the Bankruptcy Code followed the
contractarian paradigm, at the point of regret, a comparison of the cost of
inclusion per the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) (1988). See 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(d)(10)(D) (1988) for the exemption of child support payments.
100. See Shuchman, An Attempt At A "Philosophy of Bankruptcy," 21 UCLA L.
REV. 403, 422 (1973).
101. See Leff, supra note 63, at 135-39.
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continued performance and the cost of renegotiation or judgment in the
amount of the price remaining in the contract would determine whether
bankruptcy should be alloWed.1°2 In a Chapter 7, however, discharged
future earnings are not an element for consideration. The debtor's protection
of future earnings is absolute under the definition of property and the fresh
start policy.' 3 Again, this is inconsistent with contractarian analysis but is
consistent with a public interest model; it allows the debtor to once again
become a fully-contributing member of society with income free from the
creditor's grasp.
If Chapter 7 claims were treated the same as contract law on damages,
and law governing collection processes, a debtor would have all property
available for seizure at the time the bankruptcy was initiated; garnishment of
future income would stand; assignment of future income could be made, and
a lien on property obtained after bankruptcy would be enforced. Yet, with
very limited exceptions, bankruptcy allows protection of the debtor from each
of these collection devices. The rationale for the current level of protection
cannot be supported on the basis of contractarian principles. The utilitarian
principles are further supported by protections afforded under federal and state
bankruptcy law. These protections extend the amount of excludable property
consistent with current local and national ideas of what is in the best interest
of the individual's welfare.
A. The Exclusion of Pension Funds from Estate Property
The Code's blanket exclusion of future assets is refined by indirectly
excluding from its definition of property certain types of pension funds.
Section 541(c)(2)1"4 provides "that a restriction on the transfer of a benefi-
cial interest of a debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law" is excluded from the definition of property found at
541(a)(1). 5 One area of "applicable nonbankruptcy" law is state law on
spendthrift trusts.1' 6 This conclusion relies partly on H.R. Rep. No. 95-595
102. Any renegotiation will also likely include a tax on future assets. In fact, on
the market an individual may prefer a tax on future assets in exchange for retaining
present assets which must be surrendered to the trustee.
103. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (1988).
104. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988).
105. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988).
106. See In re De Prazza, 29 Bankr. 916 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1983); H.R. Rep. No.




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/2
BANKRUPTCY JURISPRUDENCE
which instructs that 541(2)(c) maintains restrictions on transfers found in a
spendthrift trust account which are enforceable by state law.10 7
107. A typical spendthrift trust statute reads as follows:
Alienation of interest of beneficiary-Rights and remedies of credi-
tors-Spendthrift trusts-Trustor's interest alienable and subject to claims
of creditors ....
Any instrument creating a trust may provide by specific words that the
interest of any beneficiary in the income of the trust shall not be subject to
voluntary or involuntary' alienation by such beneficiary. Subject to the
following provisions of this Section, a direction to this effect shall be valid
and enforceable.
A. Notwithstanding a provision in the terms of a trust restraining the
alienation of the interest of a beneficiary, such interest shall be entitled to
be reached in the satisfaction of claims to the following extent:
1. All income due or to accrue in the future to the beneficiary
shall be subject to enforceable claims under the laws of this
State for,
(a) support of a husband, wife, or child of the
beneficiary,
(b) necessary services rendered or necessary supplies
furnished to the beneficiary, or
(c) a judgment based on any such claim under (a) or
(b).
2. In all cases not mentioned in preceding sub-section 1 herein
all income due or to accrue in the future to the beneficiary in
excess of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) per annum based
upon calendar year of the trust, shall be subject to garnishment
by creditors of the beneficiary and shall be fully alienable by the
beneficiary.
B. Where two or more creditors undertake to reach the interest
of any beneficiary of a trust, pursuant to the provisions of this
Section, they shall be subject to priority of payment in the order
of the service of a notice of'garnishment on the trustee. The
pendency of any attachment or garnishment shall not prevent the
filing of a further attachment or garnishment by the same or any
other creditor.
C. Where the beneficiary of any spendthrift trust is also the beneficiary
under any other spendthrift trust created or administered either within or
without this State, the aggregate income payable under all such trusts to the
beneficiary shall be considered together for the purpose of determining the
rights of creditors and assignees under this Section.
D. The right of any beneficiary of a trust to receive the principal of the
trust or any part of it, presently or in the future, shall not be alienable and
shall not be subject to the claims of his creditors.
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In re Gofft is often cited as standing for the proposition that "applica-
ble nonbankruptcy" law refers only to state spendthrift law. In Goff the
trustee sought inclusion of A debtor's Keogh fund in the estate."° The Fifth
Circuit agreed with the trustee's interpretation of section 541(c)(2) pointing
to the narrow legislative interpretation of the provision evidenced in the
legislative history of the Code. °
In In re Braden"' the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan applied New York Statutes on anti-alienation as the "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" to reach the conclusion that funds in a teachers'
retirement and annuity plan funds were not property of the bankrupt. In
granting summary judgment for the debtor, the court asserted that while some
courts had included pension plans funds in a debtor's estate "each case must
be evaluated on its own. 1 2 Thus the court must look to the varying anti-
alienation provisions of each plan and apply the appropriate state anti-
E. Where the interest of the beneficiary of a trust is subject to the exercise
of discretion by the trustee or by another, the provisions of this Act as to
the rights of creditors and assignees shall apply with respect to any sums
which the trustee or such other person determines shall be paid to or for the
beneficiary.
F. A trust in which the interest of the beneficiary is subject to restraints on
alienation as provided in this Act may be called a "spendthrift trust" and a
direction in any instrument creating a trust that the interest of any
beneficiary shall be held on or subject to a spendthrift trust shall be
sufficient to restrain the alienation of such interest to the extent provided in
this Act.
G. Nothing in this Act shall authorize a person to create a spendthrift trust
or other inalienable interest for his own benefit. The interest of the trustor
as a beneficiary of any trust shall be freely alienable and subject to the
claims of his creditors.
H. The provisions of this Section may be enforced only by an action in a
court of competent jurisdiction and the obligor beneficiary shall be a party
defendant in such action. The trustee shall not be required to recognize any
of the obligations provided for in this Section or to withhold any income
from the beneficiary until said trustee has been served with summons or
garnishment summons. Such action shall be governed by the rules of civil
procedure under the laws of Oklahoma.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60 § 175.25 (West 1991).
108. 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983).
109. Id. at 581.
110. Id. Two recent decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
limited interpretation of section 541(c)(2): In re Kincaid, 917 F.2d. 1162 (9th Cir.
1990); In re Kaplan, 97 Bankr. 572, 576 (9th Cir. 1989).
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alienation statute to determine the question of whether pension plans are
property of the estate."1 3
A similar conclusion was reached in In re Kwaak,14 a Chapter 7
proceeding filed in the Bankruptcy Court of Maine. The trustee in Kwaak
sought surrender of the debtor's interest in an employer-financed stock bonus
and profit sharing plan. s Though the court concluded that the plan's funds
were excluded by section 541(b)(2) based on state spendthrift law, the court
referred to no specific statute or case law in Maine which described the
proscriptions of Maine's spendthrift law.116 Indeed, the court acknowledged,
simply, that Maine law recognized spendthrift trusts as -valid.17 It then
applied the definition found in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts section
152(2)(1959) to determine whether the fund at issue was excluded under the
Bankruptcy Code provisions applying nonbankruptcy law. 8 In reading the
specific clause of the Employee Retirement Security Act (ERISA)"9
qualified plan in question in light of the Restatement provision, the court
concluded that the plan's funds were not property of the estate. Because the
debtor could neither "withdraw funds, deposit funds, borrow against his
interests, or manage the deposits in any way," the plan was held to create "a
spendthrift trust under state law."1 2'
Similarly, in McClean v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas
Pension Fund (In re McClean),"' a Chapter 13 proceeding, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that the state law of Illinois protected a pension fund from
the reach of the trustee in Bankruptcy.122  Under the court's reasoning,
section 1306(a) of the Code adopts the section 541 definition of property for
Chapter 13 plans with one distinction: for Chapter 13 purposes, the estate
property includes after-acquired property which otherwise qualifies under
section 541.'23 The assets excluded from the definition of property per
section 541(b)(2), however, are not subject to the after-acquired property
provision.'7 Because, for example, the spendthrift fund is excluded from
113. Id.
114. 42 Bankr. 599 (Bankr. D. Me. 1984).
115. Id. at 600.
116. Id. at 602.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
120. Kwaak, 42 Bankr. at 602.
121. 762 F.2d 1204 (4th Cir. 1985). Cf. Regan v. Pross, 691 F.2d 81 (2d Cir.
1982).
122. Id. at 1207.
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the definition of property of the estate, it and future income from it are
precluded from becoming property in a Chapter 13 proceeding. The converse
is also true; if the predistribution interest in the trust is not excluded under
section 541(c)(2), then any distribution made to the debtor during the Chapter
13 plan is available to the trustee for distribution to the creditors.1" In
applying the relevant language of the debtor's pension fund to Illinois case
law on spendthrift trusts, the court of appeals concluded that the anti-
assignment provision was "undistinguishable in critical respect" from the
provisions held enforceable by Illinois Courts.'26 Again, because the funds
were contributed by an employer and were not subject to revocation by the
employee, "public policy concerns would not therefore prevent enforcement
of the restriction."'127
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in In re McClean is representative of a line
of cases that applies state spendthrift law to determine whether the pension
funds become estate property.'2 Generally,.the analysis results in excluding
from property those trusts created by employers which are inalienable by the
employee until the trust vests. 129 The courts which uphold such exclusions
examine each fund on a case-by-case basis to determine whether or not the
fund is indeed inalienable. 3 ' These courts do not address the degree of
alienability necessary to include the funds. We might assume that the degree
of alienability would turn on what degree the state law allowed under its
spendthrift laws as the "applicable nonbankruptcy law."
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1207-08.
127. Id. at 1207.
128. Id.
129. For a discussion of how the Code abandons the broad approach of excluding
future assets followed by the Bankruptcy Act in favor of a "restrictive interpretation"
of exclusions found in 11 U.S.C. § 541(c) (1988), see In re Graham, 726 F.2d 1268,
1271-72 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Crenshaw, 44 Bankr. 30, 33 (N.D. Ala. 1984).
130. See hI re Cates, 73 Bankr. 874 (Bankr. D. Or. 1987) in which the court
applied the Oregon spendthrift law which determined that a trust created for the benefit
of the person creating the trust even though it contained a restraint on alienation or
assignment was void as far as creditors were concerned. Id. at 875-77. This court
suggests that alienation is not the issue, rather the source of the funding is the key.
Id. at 876. The court then severed the provisions to conclude that the funds that were
contributed by the employer were excluded from the estate while those contributed by
the employee were included in the estate property. Id.; In re Pettitt, 61 Bankr. 341
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1986), in which one plan of the debtor was included as property
of the trust as it was funded by the debtor and subject to her withdrawals while
another plan held by the debtor but funded by the employer was excluded. See also In
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The significance of this line of cases is twofold: first, its rejection of the
blanket exclusion of pension funds as "future assets" as a matter of right; and
second, its application of a case-by-case analysis to determine whether a fund
may be excluded from the definition of property.
Another line of cases reaches the conclusion that ERISA and other
pension plan funds are not property within the section 541 definition by
referring to the law governing ERISA-qualified plans as the "applicable
nonbankruptcy law."'' In determining whether the anti-alienation provi-
sions required by the ERISA regulation were enforceable against the trustee,
the court in Liscinski v. Mosely (In re Mosely)132 considered the "very
strong principle of state law preemption evidenced by ERISA" and the failure
of the ERISA provisions to preserve state regulation of attachment laws of the
state. 33 The court pointed to a number of areas of the law to which ERISA
concedes authority and noted that no such concession was made to law
governing attachment.33 The court reasoned that "section 541(c)(2)
therefore referred to all law that might normally apply outside of bankruptcy
proceedings and that ERISA was thus applicable.'
1 35
In a recent opinion, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Mosely position. In
Anderson v. Raine (In re Moore),36 the court of appeals rejected an inter-
pretation of section 541(c)(2) which excluded ERISA as "applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law.'03 7 The court cited the plain meaning of the term itself as
support that the anti-alienation provisions of an ERISA-qualified plan were
sufficient to make it beyond the reach of and "not subject to turnover to the
trustee.
,, 38
According to the analyses of Braden, McClean, Kwaak and Mosely, the
Code moves from the blanket treatment of assets under the language of section
541(a)(1) to application of state spendthrift law. Such laws typically also
apply the per se rule prohibiting transfer or alienation to creditors with very
131. Liscinski v. Mosely (ln re Mosely), 42 Bankr. 181, 188-90 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1984).
132. 42 Bankr. 181 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1984).
133. Id. at 188.
134. Id. at 188-89.
135. Id. at 191. Congress' intent that ERISA preempt state law may support a
conclusion that ERISA is "applicable nonbankruptcy law" per 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988).
If not, and ERISA plans funds are left subject to the exemptions of 11 U.S.C. § 522
(1988), then ERISA plans would also be subject to the opt-out provisions. If a state
is providing its own state exemptions providing an exemption for ERISA plans, state
law is allowed to supersede the anti-alienation provisions of ERISA despite the
preemptive policies behind ERISA.
136. 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990).
137. Id. at 1481.
138. Id. at 1477. See also In re Ralstin, 61 Bankr. 502 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1986).
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little analysis of the specific provisions notwithstanding the statement by the
court that each pension fund be judged on a case-by-case basis.1 39
The "bottom line" treatment excluding or exempting property is of utmost
importance to the debtor. In determining whether property should be
excluded, considerations must be given to questions other than the direct
impact on available property. Specifically, we might consider whether
pension funds which questionably are excludable by the definition are
excludable as a matter of some other policy of the Code. For example,
benefits from pension funds can be considered as future assets or future wage
substitutes. Because the Code's policy is to exclude from property future
assets and future wages, this exclusion of pension funds is consistent with the
fresh start policy as well as the language of the Code defining property of the
estate.14
Under section 70(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act future wages of the
bankrupt were not "property" even though the wages were within the reach of
the bankrupt party at the time of the bankruptcy.141 As early as the decision
in Segal v. Rochelle,142 courts attempted to reconcile the Act's definition of
"property" with the fresh start policy and anti-assignment provisions.4 3
Though the Code's definition of property is different from that of section 70
of the Bankruptcy Act144 the principle conflicts still exist. The question of
what assets are excludable under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code has been
exacerbated by the conflicting interpretations given to section 541.145 An
interpretation of section 541 that recognizes pension funds as future assets
would reconcile some of the tension between section 541 and the fresh start
policy.
If pension funds are characterized as future wage substitutes, a blanket
exclusion is warranted by the language of the Code as well as by the fresh
start policy. Even under the fresh start policy, whether funds are excludable
will turn on the definition of future wage substitutes. Should the definition
include those funds that can serve only as future wage substitutes, then the
distinction between alienable pension funds and unalienable, funds can be
139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs, § 152 (1959).
140. See supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
141. 11 U.S.C. § 70(a)(5) (1988).
142. 382 U.S. 375, 379-80 (1965).
143. Id. at 379-80.
144. Though the Code does rely solely on the distinction between assets relating
to debtor's past as opposed to future in determining what are assets, vestiges of this
concept remain with the exemption of pension funds and insurance policies. See In
re Cook, 43 Bankr. 996 (N.D. Ili. 1984); In re De Prazza, 29 Bankr. 916 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1983).
145. See supra notes 109-143"and accompanying text.
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justified. If the definition includes those assets with the potential for being
future wage substitutes, the definition could include funds that the debtor can
transfer presently. If the latter definition is chosen, there appears to be no
distinction between such pension funds and savings plans, and the latter
should arguably be excluded. 4 6
The fresh start policy and unwaiveable right to discharge of Chapter 7
would justify a distinction between treatment of a pension fund under Chapter
7 and treatment under a Chapter 13 reorganization plan. The focus of the
Chapter 13 plan is the debtor's ability to pay and to establish a plan for future
payment. 47 Thus, an inclusion of payments which may accrue to the debtor
in the course of the plan would be reasonable. Yet if the same definition is
applied to both Chapter 13 and 7 proceedings, future payments might be
excluded from a Chapter 13 plan even though the payments might be made
during the term of the plan.
While for a Chapter 7 discharge claim the exclusion of inalienable
pension funds may be reconcilable with the Code's language and the fresh
start policy, the contractarian paradigm suggests that other considerations are
warranted. 48 If bankruptcy is viewed by the bankrupt party as an alterna-
tive to breach and judgment, we might consider the treatment of pension funds
in judgment collection. Garnishment proceedings are governed by state law
and are a regular part of judgment collection.'49 Many states provide that
the anti-alienation provisions in pension agreements are valid to protect the
funds against being garnished by creditors.5 ° Congressional intent to
preempt state garnishment proceedings is expressed in ERISA and its
legislative history.15 ' This language serves as the basis for upholding the
146. See In re Gillett, 55 Bankr. 675 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985). However, the
distinction between employee established funds and employer established funds can
only be justified if the employee established fund is alienable and therefore readily
available as present income.
147. See Wolmuth, The Class Action and Bankruptcy: Tracking the Evolution of
a Legal Principle, 21 UCLA L. REV. 577, 579 (1973).
148. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
149. For example, in Missouri, see Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 513.427, .430 (1986).
150. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 (1959).
151. See General Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1980). See also
United Mine Workers of America v. Boyle, 567 F.2d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied sub. nom. Antal v. Boyle, 435 U.S. 956 (1978) (where attachment of pension
funds of former union officers was refused though officers were found to have
breached their fiduciary duty to the union); Hospital v. Greenwald, 82 Ill.App.3d 1024,
403 N.E.2d 700 (I11. App. Ct. 1980). Cf St. Paul Fire's Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 752
F.2d 550 (11th Cir. 1985) (employee's bad faith served as the basis for the garnish-
ment); Electrical Workers, Local No. 1 Credit Union v. IBEW NECA Holiday Trust
Fund, 583 S.W.2d 154 (Mo. 1979); National Bank of N. Am. v. International Bhd. of
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anti-alienation provisions found in ERISA plans. If bankruptcy were simply
to serve as a less-costly alternative to breach and judgment, funds unavailable
through judgment and collection processes should likewise be unavailable at
bankruptcy. If funds could be taxed under bankruptcy but not under state
collection proceedings, a debtor trying to protect pension funds would have
an incentive to await a judgment rather than file for discharge under Chapter
7 and risk recovery of the funds by her creditors through this process. The
anti-alienation language required of ERISA-qualified plans, like that protected
by state spendthrift provisions, is adequate to prevent the trustee from reaching
the funds of such a plan and supports the utilitarian policies the Code attempts
to promote. 5
2
The blanket exclusion of pension funds is justified by the language and
policy of the Code as well as certain nonbankruptcy law governing garnish-
ment and state spendthrift trust law. 153 Yet many courts addressing the
question have concluded that certain pension funds are not excludable.
1 54
Thus, the protection of the property and the promotion of the Code's policy
is left to the provisions exempting property from inclusion.
B. Pension Funds as Exempt Property
The Bankruptcy Code provides a scheme whereby assets of the debtor
included within the definition of "property" found at section 541 may be
exempt under section 522 from liquidation for the benefit of the creditors.15s
Though the "bottom line" treatment of exempt property may be the same as
excluded property, certain distinctions remain which may affect the decisions
of the party in bankruptcy.
First, though some property is totally exempt from creditors, certain
exempt property is subject to the limitation of being "reasonably necessary"
for "the support of the debtor.1 56 Thus a party may choose to have assets
classified as excludable property rather than exempt property in order to insure
blanket protection.157 Secondly, the Code allows states to opt out of the
Elect. Workers Local No. 3, Pension and Vacation Funds, 69 A.D.2d 679, 419
N.Y.S.2d 127 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
152. Comment C of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 152 (1959)
provides that "no particular form of words is necessary for the creation of a spendthrift
trust." Comment I also provides that the funds of a spendthrift trust do not pass to a
trustee in bankruptcy. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 (1959).
153. See supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 125-128 and accompanying text.
155. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988).
156. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1988) (emphasis added).
157. The addition of the requirement of reasonableness in 11 U.S.C
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federal exemption scheme and provide for their own exemptions;1 5 a
number of states have elected to do so.'5 9 Depending on the coverage
allowed by the debtor's state, a party may choose to have the questioned
assets classified for coverage under state exemption provisions. 60
While there is no consensus as to whether all pension funds are exempt
property under the federal bankruptcy scheme, a majority of the cases have
concluded that they are not. Section 522(b) of the Code provides that,
[n]otwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt
from property of the estate ...
(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this
section, unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor
under paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection specifically does not
so authorize; or in the alternative,
(2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other
than subsection (d) of this section, or State or local law that is
applicable on the date of the filing of the petition .... 161
§ 522(d)(10)(E) (1988) for the exemption of certain property is the first point in which
the Code expressly adopts the case-by-case standard as opposed to the absolute rule
in determining what is accessible property. This move is perhaps more closely aligned
with the original party expectations.
158. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1988).
159. See Rhodes v. Stewart, 705 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1983). For example, the
following states have opted out of the federal scheme: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Virginia, West Virginia and Wyoming.
160. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 361 (1977), such a conversion is
allowed provided that it is done without the intent to hinder delay or defraud creditors.
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (1988).
161. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988).
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Subsection (d) of section 522162 also establishes specific exemptions and
162. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1988) reads as follows:
(d) The following property may be exempted under subsection (b)(1) of
this section:
(1) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $7,500 in
value, in real property or personal property that the debtor or a
dependent of the debtor uses as a residence, in a cooperative that
owns property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses
as a residence, or in a burial plot for the debtor or a dependent
of the debtor.
(2) The debtor's interest, not to exceed $1,200 in value, in one
motor vehicle.
(3) The debtor's interest, not to exceed $200 in value in any
particular item or $4,000 in aggregate value, in household
furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances,
books, animals, crops, or musical instruments, that are held
primarily for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor
or a dependent of the debtor.
(4) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $500 in value,
in jewelry held primarily for the personal, family, or household
use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
(5) The debtor's aggregate interest in any property, not to
exceed in value $400 plus up to $3,750 of any unused amount
of the exemption provided under paragraph (1) of this subsec-
tion.
(6) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $750 in value,
in any implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of
the debtor or the trade of a dependent of the debtor.
(7) Any unmatured life insurance contract owned by the debtor,
other than a credit life insurance contract.
(8) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed in value
$4,000 less any amount of property of the estate transferred in
the manner specified in section 542(d) of this title, in any
accrued dividend or interest under, or loan value of, any
unmatured life insurance contract owned by the debtor under
which the insured is the debtor or an individual of whom the
debtor is a dependent.
(9) Professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a
dependent of the debtor.
(10) The debtor's right to receive-
(A) a social security benefit, unemployment compen-
sation, or a local public assistance benefit;
(B) a veterans' benefit;
(C) a disability, illness, or unemployment benefit;
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(D) alimony, support or separate maintenance, to the
extent reasonably necessary for the support of the
debtor and any dependent of the debtor;
(E) a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profit-
sharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract on
account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of
service, to the extent reasonably necessary for the
support of the debtor and any dependent of the
debtor, unless--
(i) such plan or contract was established
by or under the auspices of an insider that
employed the debtor at the time the
debtor's rights under such plan or contract
arose;
(ii) such payment is on account of age or
length of service; and
(iii) such plan or contract does not qualify
under section 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408,
or 409 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 (26 U.S.C. 401(a), 403(a), 403(b),
408, or 409).
(11) The debtor's right to receive, or property that is traceable
to-
(A) an award under a crime victim's reparation law;
(B) a payment on account of the wrongful death of
an individual of whom the debtor was a dependent, to
the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the
debtor and any dependent of the debtor;
(C) a payment under a life insurance contract that
insured the life of an individual of whom the debtor
was a dependent on the date of such individual's
death, to the extent reasonably necessary for the
support of the debtor and any dependent of the
debtor;
(D) a payment, not to exceed $7,500, on account of
personal bodily injury, not including pain and suffer-
ing or compensation for actual pecuniary loss, of the
debtor or an individual of whom the debtor is a
dependent; or
(E) a payment in compensation of loss of future
earnings of the debtor or an individual of whom the
debtor is or was a dependent, to the extent reasonably
necessary for the support of the debtor and any
dependent of the debtor.
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section 522(b)(2)(A)'" exempts property by reference to 'applicable' federal
and state nonbankruptcy law.
Four circuit courts of appeal have examined the provisions of sections
522(b) and 522(d) on the question of whether pension funds are exempted
property and have concluded that ERISA-qualified plans are neither excluded
nor exempt from the bankrupt's estate.16 Their reasoning as applied to
ERISA plans is as follows. While both House and Senate Reports on the
Bankruptcy Code list property which can be exempted under federal law,
neither list ERISA pension funds. 65 Other pension programs are specifical-
163. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988) reads:
(b) Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may
exempt from property of the estate the property listed in either paragraph
(1) or, in the alternative, paragraph (2) of this subsection. In joint cases
filed under section 302 of this title and individual cases filed under section
301 or 303 of this title by or against debtors who are husband and wife, and
whose estates are ordered to be jointly administered under Rule 1015(b) of
the Bankruptcy Rules, one debtor may not elect to exempt property listed
in paragraph (1) and the other debtor elect to exempt property listed in
paragraph (2) of this subsection. If the parties cannot agree on the
alternative to be elected, they shall be deemed to elect paragraph (1), where
such election is permitted under the law of the jurisdiction where the case
is filed. Such property is--
(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this
section; unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor
under paragraph (2) (A) of this subsection specifically does not
so authorize; or, in the alternative,
(2) (A) any property that is exempt under Federal law,
other than subsection (d) of this section, or State or
local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of
the petition at the place in which the debtor's domi-
cile has been located for the 180 days immediately
preceding the date of the filing of the petition, or for
a longer portion of such 180-day period than in any
other place; and
(B) any interest in property in which the debtor had,
immediately before the commencement of the case,
an interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant
to the extent that such interest as a tenant by the
entirety or joint tenant is exempt from process under
applicable nonbankruptcy law.
Id.
164. See In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1985); In re Lech Strahl, 750 F.2d
1488 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Graham, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Goff, 706
F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Gillett, 55 Bankr. 675 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985).
165. See In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 352, 359-61 (9th Cir. 1985).
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ly listed as exempt property. Those listed as exempt property are peculiarly
federal in origin such as Civil Service retirement benefits, Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, death and disability benefits, and
Railroad Retirement Act annuities and pensions." The list suggests that
section 522(d) was to apply to federally-established pension funds but not
privately-established funds. In addition, Congress failed to include ERISA
plans under section 522(d). The exclusion of ERISA from mention in the
language and legislative history of section 522(d) as well as its inclusion in
other portions of the history appears purposeful and supports the conclusion
that the anti-alienation provisions of ERISA alone are not enough to bring it
into the protection of section 522(d).
While there is some support for the conclusion that inalienable pension
funds are excludable as future wages, 67 there is little support in light of the
legislative history that ERISA funds or other private pension funds should be
exempt under section 522(d). A conclusion that the ERISA plans are neither
excluded or fully exempted in bankruptcy, however, proves problematic if in
fact the anti-assignment and alienation clauses exempt the funds from
garnishment. What this means in effect is that the debtor is allowed to lose
through bankruptcy what she would not lose in a judgment against her. For
those whose private pension funds make up a substantial portion of their
assets, from a strictly economic point of view, default and jfidgment would be
preferable to bankruptcy.
If ERISA or other pension funds are neither excluded or blanketly-
exempted one safeguard remains. The funds may be exempted conditionally
from the bankruptcy trustee's control under section 522(d)(10)(E).' 6  The
conclusion that ERISA plans are exempt under Section 522(d)(10)(E) is well
supported by the language of the Code and the legislative history.169
Because the exemption of section 522(d)(10)(E) is limited to amounts
reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor, however, it may not protect
fully the debtor's interests.
In pronouncing the protection of section 522(d)(10)(E), the Code speaks
in terms of reason rather than absolute right to exemption or exclusion. 7 '
166. Id. at 360 n.18.
167. We could argue, however, that if Congress intended ERISA and other
pension funds to be excluded from the section 541(a) then it would not have provided
for their exemption under 522(d)(10). Such an argument would rely on the
interpretation of the specific language of 541(c)(2) whereas the argument for exclusion
relies on the general fresh start policy and exclusion of future assets altogether.
168. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1988).
169. See supra notes 105-140 and accompanying text.
170. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1988). Section 522(d)(10)(E) uses the
language "to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor.. . ." Id.
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The language invites the case-by-case approach..' and allows inquiry into
the appropriateness of the exemption for the particular individual. The
language limits inquiry to the post-regret circumstances of the party. The
standard does not lend itself to consideration of the providence of the debtor's
original decision to obtain credit or the creditor's decision to extend it, or the
original expectations of the parties. Nonetheless, such a standard maintains
the commercial law policy of relief of hardship in worthwhile cases.'7 2 The
Code begins to shift away from its utilitarian position to a contractarian
position.
Such considerations are inconsistent with the basic principles of
bankruptcy law as espoused by the fresh start policy. It allows.examination
at the point of the debtor's regret to determine whether the assets might
reasonably be used to satisfy the expectations of the creditors. If the question
is whether to exempt a pension fund in the estate under section 522(d)(10)(E),
another question follows: what of the debtor's future property should she
have to give up in order to relieve herself of the current regretted bargain?
Even this approach to bargaining away the future interests in order to protect
present interests does not exist under the Code's scheme as it might in the
market.'
The reasonableness standard does allow some market considerations to
be made. For example, in the context of renegotiation of an obligation in the
market, two factors are important to the debtor in deciding between mortgag-
ing the future payments and making payments currently: (1) the amount of
income available in and from the fund; and (2) her ability to earn income to
contribute to future payments. 74 These factors are the same factors the
court applying a contractarian paradigm might consider in determining what
would reduce the hardship of the debtor's circumstances. The debtor who has
large sums of money collected in a pension fund and nears retirement or the
debtor who is unsure of his ability to earn income in the future is not likely
even in good faith to agree to surrender pension funds. Conversely, the
younger debtor who can expect to work thirty more years and has only
171. See McCauley, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read-Business Run by
IBM Machines, The Law of Contracts & Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REv. 1056-65
(1966).
172. For a discussion of how the Code abandons the broad approach of excluding
future assets followed by the Bankruptcy Act in favor of a "restrictive interpretation"
of the exclusions found in 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988), see In re Graham, 726 F.2d
1268, 1271-72 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Crenshaw, 44 Bankr. 30, 33 (N.D. Ala. 1984).
173. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1988).
174. The ability to earn income depends on at least two variables: the debtor's
income earning ability as determined by job skills, experience, and education, and the
debtor's expected income earning lifespan.
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recently started a pension fund is more likely to bargain the fund away.' 75
In considering whether the funds in a pension plan are reasonably necessary
for the support of the debtor, current lifestyle should not be the major
consideration. 76 Of greater concern should be earning potential in light of
the debtor's current marketable skills, age, income and any changes in the
debtor's circumstances such as job loss and divorce.177
The inclusion of a reasonableness standard, however determined, marks
the change in the Bankruptcy Code to an approach which is more consistent
with a contractarian view of the Code's goals and is in fact consistent with
expectations of parties. Such a standard as applied under section
522(d)(10)(E), however, is not consistent with the utilitarian principles of the
Code or public law model for espousing those principles. ' In sur, the total
exemption of pension funds is consistent with the fresh start policy of the
Code. As with the blanket exclusion, questions of whether total exemption
is necessary to fulfill the purposes of the Code still remain. Total exemption
is at least consistent with the utilitarian view of public perspective of
individual welfare. The exemption of funds necessary for the support of the
debtor is consistent with the Code's goal of relieving individual, hardship.
Whether pension funds are excluded from the estate property under section
522(b) or section 522(b)(10)(E) conflicts with the internal policies of the Code
and reasonable individual expectations of the exchange process of the
underlying purposes of the Code.
Potentially, additional internal conflict is created by the Code's allowing
states to opt-out of the federal exemption scheme.' 78 The Code's opt-out
provisions have withstood several challenges. 179 Challenges based on the
overbreadth'80 as well as the narrowness' of the states' provisions have
been denied. Despite Congress's clear intent that ERISA preempt or
supersede any state law which "may now or hereafter relate to any employee
175. For psychological reasons, this may be true of the younger individual
regardless of whether they have a greater or lesser earning capacity. The younger
individual who is further removed from retirement will probably have a more
optimistic view of the future and the ability to provide for her retirement than the older
individual. See Iz re Kochell, 732 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1984).
176. See In re Taff, 10 Bankr. 101 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
177. Id.
178. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988).
179. In re McManus, 681 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1982); In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131
(7th Cir. 1982); In re Laurch, 16 Bankr. 162 (M.D. Fla. 1981).
180. See Brief for the Trustee, In re Garrison, (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1987) (No. 87-
02508).
181. See Rhodes v. Stewart, 705 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1983) (upholding State of
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benefit plan,"' 8 a state may now adopt under the Code's opt-out provision
statutes which would allow the trustee in bankruptcy to liquidate the ERISA
fund of an individual debtor. 8 3 The opt-out provision and the ability of a
trustee to freely retain funds under the state law apparently apply even to the
federally-funded programs denoted under section 522(b).a" a
Whereas the opt-out provision may allow for more consistency with state
collection proceedings, the potential for conflict with federal law including the
Code is enhanced. Moreover, no restraints on the states' power to opt out of
the federal scheme are apparent in the language of the Code. 85 A court
would strain to read into the Code's language any congressional intent to limit
in any way state exemption schemes. In fact, a state could nullify the fresh
start policy by allowing the bankruptcy trustee to collect a portion of all of the
debtor's pension fund.
Allowing the state to provide its own exemptions may in fact contribute
to a lack of uniformity in the bankruptcy law among jurisdictions and result
in a lack of consistency between the overall policy of the Code and the
exemption schemes adopted by states.'6 The state exemption scheme as
part of a debtor/ creditor collection process, however, may allow for more
consistency with state collection proceedings. For example, in a scheme such
as the one adopted by the Oklahoma legislature, if a creditor cannot collect
under a judgment or lien from the pension fund, he is precluded collecting in
bankruptcy.' 87 Therefore, the problem of being able to get more under
182. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988).
183. The relationship of ERISA and other state law has been questioned in several
cases. See, e.g., Bucyrus-Erie Comp. v. Department of Indus., 599 F.2d 205 (7th Cir.
1979). Recent challenges to state exemption schemes have resulted in invalidation of
certain state exemptions which attempt to protect ERISA pension funds from inclusion
in the estate of a debtor. See In re Lee, 119 Bankr. 333 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); In
re Smith, 115 Bankr. 144 (Bankr. C.D. I11. 1990). Much of this litigation results from
the Supreme Court decision in Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S.
385 (1988), in which the court reiterated its interpretation of ERISA. Ifi the Court's
opinion, the provisions of ERISA preempt any state law which relates to pension funds
even where the state law purpose is not in conflict with ERISA. Cf In re Lingle, 119
Bankr. 677 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1990); In re Dyke, 119 Bankr. 536 (S.D. Tex. 1990).
184. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988).
185. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 955-57.
186. The courts who have ruled on the question of the validity of the state opt-out
provisions have noted that the conflict is one that the Code permits. See In re
Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131, 1137 (7th Cir. 1982).
187. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31 § 1A(20) (West 1991) reads as follows:
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bankruptcy than under a judgment does not exist, and bankruptcy maintains
its policies. Thus, while the opt-out provision may destroy the internal
consistency of the Code, it may in effect enhance its consistency with
nonbankruptcy collection processes and with an expectation view of contract
law.
A. Except as otherwise provided in this title and notwithstanding
subsection B of this section, the following property shall be
reserved to every person residing in the state, exempt from
attachment or execution and every other species of forced sale
for the payment of debts, except as herein provided:
20. Subject to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act,
Section 112 et sq. of Title 24 of the Oklahoma Statutes, any
interest in a retirement plan or arrangement qualified for tax
exemption purposes under present or future Acts of Congress;
provided, such interest shall be exempt only to the extent that
contributions by or on behalf of a participant were not subject to
federal income taxation to such participant at the time of such
contributions, plus earnings and other additions thereon; provided
further, any transfer or rollover contribution between retirement
plans or arrangements, which avoids current federal income
taxation shall not be deemed a transfer which is fraudulent as to
a creditor under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. "Retire-
ment plan or arrangement qualified for tax exemption purposes"
shall include without limitation, trusts, custodial accounts,
insurance, annuity contracts and other properties and rights
constituting a part thereof. By way of example and not by
limitation, retirement plans or arrangements qualified for tax
exemption purposes permitted under present Acts of Congress
include defined contribution plans and defined benefit plans as
defined under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), individual
retirement annuities, simplified employee pension plans, Keogh
plans, IRC Section 403(b) annuities, and eligible state deferred
compensation plans governed under IRC Section 457.
This provision shall be in addition to and not a limitation of any
other provision of the Oklahoma Statutes which grants an
exemption from attachment or execution and every other species
of forced sale for the payment of debts. This provision shall be
effective for retirement plans and arrangements in existence on,
or created after the effective date of this Act.
Id.
The portion of the statute which references ERISA funds had been invalidated
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On the other hand, if the state exemption scheme is consistent with
general utilitarian principles, the opt-out provision may allow greater
protection of individual welfare interests than those allowed by the Code.
Thus, the real concern with the opt-out provision is that a state is not
compelled to follow either the contractarian or the utilitarian view and the
bankruptcy policy gets inconsistently applied.
One final area of concern is the Bankruptcy Code's provision for the
conversion of nonexempt property to exempt property under either section
522(b) or section 522(d)."'8 The Bankruptcy Code imposes a general good
faith standard on the behavior of the individual debtor seeking discharge. It
also provides specifically for such a standard in allowing conversion of
nonexempt property. The good faith standard is apparently subjective with the
burden of proving other than good faith on the trustee.189 If the trustee can
establish that a conversion was made with the "intent to hinder, delay or
defraud the proceedings," the trustee can overcome the presumption that an
exemption is valid.1'9 The presumption of good faith, however, continues
even though the transfer is made admittedly in anticipation of bankruptcy. 91
The existence of this provision and the standard of proof are inconsistent with
contractarian principles which would protect the creditor's access to this
property.
No clear meaning of the term "to hinder, delay or defraud the proceed-
ings" has been pronounced. The language has been reviewed by several
courts and resulted in inconsistent conclusions in indistinguishable situa-
tions.' 92 Moreover, while a conversion to any allowed federal exemptions
may be limited by the language of section 522(d)(10) as "reasonably necessary
for the debtor's support,"' 93 property exempted under section 522(b) may not
be similarly restricted. Where the debtor transfers assets to section 522(b)
exempt property, the problem of lack of internal uniformity is again present.
The lack of uniformity may result in an inconsistency in bankruptcy law and
188. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988).
189. 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (1988). See also 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) (1988),
whereby a creditor may bring a proceeding to exempt from discharge a loan obtained
through the use of a materially false writing with the intent to deceive the creditors.
190. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1988).
191. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(3)(i) (1988).
192. See, e.g., In re Levine, 40 Bankr. 76 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984) (conversion
of nonexempt assets to exempt homestead property on the advice of bankruptcy
counsel was allowed as permissible pre-bankruptcy planning). But see Mickelson v.
Anderson, 31 Bankr. 635 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982) (similar conversions were
disallowed).
193. 11 U.S.C § 522(d)(10) (1988).
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state collection law proceedings. In striking a balance, greater weight should
be given to consistent application of the policies supporting bankruptcy law.
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRUCTURE, APPROACH AND
FUNCTION IN THE CODE
When viewed from a utilitarian paradigm, the substance of the Code
closely approximates the policies behind bankruptcy law. In addition, it also
succeeds in linking the function of bankruptcy law to its structure.'9 This
subjects the Code to two criticisms of its structure -and approach. The
structural criticisms can be described in two related but distinct ways. The
first is that of overclassification. The second problem is that of reliance upon
right over reasonableness from an individual's perspective. 95
A. Classification and the Code
One source has stated that the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act are: "(1)
the effective rehabilitation of the bankrupt and (2) the equitable distribution
of his assets among his creditors."' 96  Thus, in order to effectuate its
purposes the Code must identify the "bankrupt" and "creditors.' 197 Classifi-
cations are quite helpful for the purposes of bankruptcy law. Because all
debtors are not identical and the same is true of creditors, classifications can
help identify nonidentical debtors or creditors for different treatment by the
Code.
Classification in bankruptcy relieves the trustee of the need to determine
on an individual basis who is a creditor and eventually what priority each
creditor should be given. The Code assists the trustee by distinguishing
between secured creditors and unsecured creditors; payment priorities are set
on this basis.'98 Use of the identification process established by the Code
194. Arguably, it is impossible to separate function from structure because
structure necessarily follows function. Assuming the truth of that position indicts the
Code because it chooses a structure which does not follow naturally from its stated
function.
195. The discussion which follows expands upon the ideas expressed by the
following scholars: Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949
(1985); Leff, supra note 63, at 136-51; 19 AM. U. L. REv..131.(1970); McCauley,
Justice Traynor and the Law of Contracts, 13 STAN. L. REV. 812 (1961).
196. H.R. REP. No. 687, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965).
197. See Leff, supra note 63, at 134-35.
198. See Shuchman, supra note 100, at 405.
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is much easier than simply applying the purpose of "equitable distribution to
the creditors" in each bankruptcy claim.""
Though classification may be useful, it is potentially harmful in the
following ways. First, the connection between the classification and the
desired end may be inaccurate. Little empirical work was done on bankruptcy
cases before the adoption of the Code to determine what kinds of classifica-
tions for debtors and creditors best met the purpose of bankruptcy law.20°
Thus, the danger of using imprecise classifications or classifications which are
antagonistic to the purpose of bankruptcy exists.
Finally, if all members of a class are treated as though they are the
same--either as a composite of all debtors or unsecured creditors or as a
specific type of debtor or creditor--there is no room for a case-by-case
approach in analyzing the bankruptcy claim; the purpose of the bankruptcy
law may be lost.2 1 Thus, the Code imposes a collectivistic view of individu-
al welfare upon the debtor and fails to take into account individual differences.
This position is defensible from a utilitarian standpoint though not from the
contractarian point of view.
B. Rights vs. Reason
As the Bankruptcy Code diverges from the principles of contractarianism
and allows parties to be excused from their contractual obligations, its goals
are less market-oriented and more social welfare-oriented. The main purpose
of the Code has become the discharge of the debts of the bankrupt.02
Utilitarian concerns about individual welfare which serve as bases of the
relief can be characterized as equitable nonmarket concepts such as relieving
the individual from oppressive debts; rehabilitating the debtor; protecting the
debtor's future; and granting the debtor a fresh start. It has been argued that
the social and economic welfare goal of the Code is best expressed in a case-
199. See Leff, supra note 63, at 134-35.
200. Similar observations can be made about the Code's property classifications.
The lines between what is included within the property of the estate and what is either
excluded or exempted are obscure. 11 U.S.C. § 522,541(1988). No link between the
different classes of property and the purposes of the Code are readily apparent.
201. The Code necessarily is'a mixture of market-oriented policies and social
welfare policies. For example, the Code's classification of creditors into secured and
unsecured creditors appears to relate to market policy of recognizing additional
protection fixed by the parties. However, the idea of barring collection and allocating
the claims of unsecured parties based on pro rata share is supported by a nonmarket
policy. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973) ("bankruptcy legislation
is in the area of economics and social welfare").
202. See McCauley, supra note 195, at 815. The rules or generalizing approach
is best suited to promotion of market functioning policy from which the Code diverges.
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by-case approach of the court as opposed to a blanket approach. The case by
case or particularized approach is best stated in a legal standard that relies on
reasonableness rather than an absolute right.m The Code's policy is a
policy of relief for individuals from the hardship of certain debts.
Yet this argument ignores the right of the lawmaker to establish a line for
the protection of the public's interest in forgiving debtors. This approach is
expressed in the access granted to the discharge process. It is a term of right
rather than of reason and allows that right to all. The Code's property
definition initially is similarly expressed. Interests are included with specific
exemptions or exclusions allowed or disallowed. It is only in the final
analysis that exemptions are governed by a reasonable standard. Thus, the
initial purpose expressed by the Code is consistent with the approach it takes
in determining: who has access to the process; which debts will be dis-
charged; and what property will be included in the estate. Though the form
or the approach of the Code reduces the likelihood of individualized relief and
is indefensible from a contractarian perspective, it is consistent with a
utilitarian approach. A utilitarian approach, where the majority determines the
appropriate level of protection for similarly-situated debtors, is appropriate for
the kinds of rights protected by the Code, recognizing the great public interest
the population has in establishing a policy for broad scale debt relief.
VI. CONCLUSION
The failures of the Bankruptcy Code can be described in a number of
ways. The Code has been criticized because of its reliance on state law as
well as its failure to use state law as a starting point. While some have
criticized the liberality of the fresh start policy, others have defended that
policy. This Article argues that much of the criticism results from the view
of the Code from a contractarian perspective. The appropriate paradigm from
which the Code should be viewed is utilitarian. Whether to maintain the free
access or fresh start policies is a matter of debate which requires more
empirical study than is available to date. Both policies promote the utilitarian
function of the Code though they may not be consistent with other state and
federal laws that are based on contractarianism. Moreover, not only is there
consistency in the function of the law and its substance, but also there is
consistency in the function and on certain levels in the Code's form. As we
near the end of the growth in bankruptcy filings, we must reassess the
203. See Fletcher, supra note 195, at 953. See also Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685, 1687-95 (1976) for
a discussion of the use of standards versus rules in private law.
204. The reasonable standard was promulgated in these statutes: 11 U.S.C
§§ 541, 522(b)(1), 522(d)(10)(E) (1988).
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bankruptcy law and theory to determine whether to continue with the
utilitarian approach and whether the specific provisions enacted are consistent
with such principles.
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